From a leader-centred to a party-centred system? The curious case of media (de-)personalisation in Yugoslavia and Croatia, 1945–2015 by Šimunjak, Maja
Middlesex University Research Repository
An open access repository of
Middlesex University research
http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk
Šimunjak, Maja ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8263-272X (2018) From a leader-centred
to a party-centred system? The curious case of media (de-)personalisation in Yugoslavia and
Croatia, 1945–2015. Europe-Asia Studies, 70 (9) . pp. 1496-1514. ISSN 1465-3427
(doi:10.1080/09668136.2018.1533915)
Final accepted version (with author’s formatting)
This version is available at: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/25828/
Copyright:
Middlesex University Research Repository makes the University’s research available electronically.
Copyright and moral rights to this work are retained by the author and/or other copyright owners
unless otherwise stated. The work is supplied on the understanding that any use for commercial gain
is strictly forbidden. A copy may be downloaded for personal, non-commercial, research or study
without prior permission and without charge.
Works, including theses and research projects, may not be reproduced in any format or medium, or
extensive quotations taken from them, or their content changed in any way, without first obtaining
permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). They may not be sold or exploited commercially in
any format or medium without the prior written permission of the copyright holder(s).
Full bibliographic details must be given when referring to, or quoting from full items including the
author’s name, the title of the work, publication details where relevant (place, publisher, date), pag-
ination, and for theses or dissertations the awarding institution, the degree type awarded, and the
date of the award.
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact the
Repository Team at Middlesex University via the following email address:
eprints@mdx.ac.uk
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated.
See also repository copyright: re-use policy: http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/policies.html#copy
1 
 
MAJA ŠIMUNJAK, Middlesex University London, Department of Media, The Burroughs, London, NW4 4BT, UK. 
Email: M.Simunjak@mdx.ac.uk 
 
From a Leader-centred to a Party-centred System? The Curious 
Case of Media (De-)personalisation in Yugoslavia and Croatia, 
1945–2015 
 
MAJA ŠIMUNJAK 
 
 
Abstract 
It is often argued that the politics of Central Eastern European countries revolve around political leaders. This can 
inhibit the development of fragile political institutions and the process of democratisation in general. This article 
examines patterns of media representation of political actors in the transition from a communist to a post-communist 
setting in the case of Yugoslavia and Croatia. The results show that, although there are significant similarities between 
the prominence of leaders in the communist and early post-communist eras, in the process of democratisation media 
attention has shifted significantly from leaders to parties as collectives . 
 
 
THIS ARTICLE EXAMINES PATTERNS AND TRENDS RELATED TO MEDIA representation of political leaders and political 
parties during the process of democratisation from a system of authoritarian, communist rule to a democratic, post-
communist one.
1
 The aim of the study is to test the ‘media personalisation’ hypothesis, developed and examined in 
                                                 
1 Communist and post-communist systems and the process of democratisation are understood in this article as 
comprehensive, and not only political concepts. Accordingly, a communist system is considered to be a one-party 
system with tendencies towards state and common ownership and deferential, politically controlled media (Furtak 
1986; Voltmer 2008; Lauk 2009). Democratisation is understood as a process in which a communist system transforms 
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established Western democracies, in a Central Eastern European context. According to mainstream scholarship 
relating to the media prominence of political leaders and parties, the media have in the past few decades increased 
their focus on political leaders as individuals at the expense of collective political bodies, such as parties or 
governments (McAllister 2007; Maier & Adam 2010; Langer 2011). This phenomenon is usually considered to be an 
aspect of the ‘personalisation of politics’ and is referred to as ‘media personalisation’ (Rahat & Sheafer 2007; 
Boumans et al. 2013).  
One of the most comprehensive comparative studies of the media representation of political actors in 
European societies, albeit not a longitudinal one, shows that personalised reporting is a contemporary characteristic 
of not only Western European societies but also those of Southern and Northern Europe (de Vreese et al. 2017). Of 
14 examined European democracies, political institutions are more media-visible than individual politicians only in 
Spain and Switzerland, and even there by only a small margin (de Vreese et al. 2017). None of the new European 
democracies formed after the fall of communism in 1990s were included in the analysis. Furthermore, existing 
longitudinal studies seem to support the claim that media reporting in previous decades was less personalised and that 
more attention was given to political institutions (Dalton & Wattenberg 2000; Langer 2011). However, the evidence 
again speaks only for political actors’ representation trends in established (Western) democracies, such as the US, the 
UK, France, and Canada.  
This study aims to contribute to political communication scholarship by examining the development of the 
media representation of political actors in Central and Eastern Europe. Alongside the fact that the personalisation 
phenomenon is under-researched in this setting, another reason for studying it in the context of democratisation is the 
central place of individual actors within political systems in this region, both under communism and in the current 
post-communist era: collective political bodies and institutions, such as governments and parties, are under-
institutionalised and dominated by politicians, especially leaders. The literature on European communist leadership 
cults suggests that communist leaders were the single most important political actors in the countries they ruled, and 
that their cults were created by an extensive use of mass media (Apor et al. 2004; Leese 2014). Similarly, it is argued 
                                                 
into a democratic system: ‘the introduction and extension of citizenship rights and the creation of a democratic state’ 
through reforms of a country’s political, economic, cultural and social system (Grugel 2002, p. 5). Consequently, post-
communist systems are defined as new systems formed after the fall of communism that have underwent, or are still 
undergoing, the process of democratisation (Grugel 2002; Voltmer 2008). 
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that post-communist politics and political communication are also dominated by individuals and that this continuous 
centrality of leaders can inhibit the development of already fragile political institutions, party systems, and the process 
of democratic transition in general (Lewis 2000; King 2002; Tomšič & Prijon 2010).  
By examining the validity of these claims, this article exposes the limitations of mainstream media 
personalisation theory, particularly its universality and applicability beyond the Western world, and reveals new media 
representation trends in a Central Eastern European country. Consequently, this study contributes to the literature on 
democratisation and political communication by testing the media personalisation hypothesis in the context of Central 
Eastern Europe, examining the extent to which European communist leadership cults can be seen as extreme forms of 
media personalisation, and exploring how, if at all, media representation of political actors changes during the process 
of democratisation. 
 
The personalisation hypothesis 
Personalisation theory suggests that political communication has over the past few decades become more focused on 
individual political actors, especially political leaders, while the visibility and importance of collective political actors, 
such as political parties and governments, has decreased (Poguntke & Webb 2005; McAllister 2007; Maier & Adam 
2010; Langer 2011; Bjerling 2012). This shift in the focus on individual political actors has most frequently been 
theorised and researched with regards to the increasing importance and power of political leaders within executives 
and parties (Poguntke & Webb 2005; Rahat & Sheafer 2007), a greater emphasis on political leaders in election 
campaigns and promotional materials (Maier & Adam 2010; Lengauer & Winder 2013), leaders’ effect on voting 
behaviour (Curtice & Holmberg 2005; Karvonen 2010; Balmas et al. 2014) and the increased visibility of political 
leaders in media reporting (Rahat & Sheafer 2007; Downey & Stanyer 2010; Maier & Adam 2010; Langer 2011; 
Boumans et al. 2013). This study is focused on the last aspect, often termed ‘media personalisation’. 
There is a growing body of evidence that supports the media personalisation thesis, at least in established 
Western democracies where this kind of research has mostly been carried out. Specifically, research has shown that 
since World War II, political leaders have become more media-visible at the expense of their parties in the United 
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Kingdom (Langer 2011), Austria, France, the US and Canada (Dalton & Wattenberg 2000).
2
 There is also evidence 
that political leaders have become more media-visible in Germany since 1945 (Wilke & Reinemann 2001; Reinemann 
& Wilke 2007), although the trend is not linear; also, research shows that the German media reported the 2009 general 
elections by focusing more on political parties than leaders (Holtz-Bacha et al. 2014). Amongst existing longitudinal 
studies focused on personalised reporting, only analyses of the Swedish media show almost no support for the media 
personalisation hypothesis. While political leaders have not become more visible in Swedish media over the past few 
decades, there is no evidence that they have become decreasingly media prominent (Johansson 2008; Bjerling 2012). 
The focus of existing research into media personalisation is mostly on the representation of political leaders, 
usually party leaders and heads of the executive. Balmas et al. (2014) term this ‘centralized personalization’, claiming 
there is hardly any evidence on the visibility in media reporting of politicians who do not hold the highest political 
positions, and whether they have become more prominent in the media over time. They define this process as 
‘decentralized personalization’ and suggest it demonstrates that ‘power flows downwards from the group to individual 
politicians’ (Balmas et al. 2014, p. 37). This indicates that the power is not centralised, but rather dispersed within the 
members of the collective who are gaining media visbility.  
In sum, the cases of Germany and Sweden clearly show that the phenomenon of media personalisation is not 
universal or consistent across Western democracies. However, as Maier and Adam (2010) concluded in their state of 
the field analysis, there is a fair amount of evidence to support the hypothesis that political leaders have become 
increasingly media-visible since the end of the Second World War. What the overview of media personalisation 
research also shows is that most literature is Western-centric, and that we are only able to speculate how, if at all, 
personalised reporting develops beyond the Western world.  
 
Leadership cult―extreme form of media personalisation? 
If personalised politics are those in which political communication actors—the media, politicians and parties, and 
voters—focus on political leader at the expense of political collectives, leadership cults can be seen as an extreme 
form of personalised politics: the ‘god-like glorification of a modern political leader with mass medial’ (Plamper 2004, 
                                                 
2 For a rare insight into personalisation in a non-Western context, see the following studies of personalised 
politics in Israel (Rahat & Sheafer 2007; Balmas et al. 2014). 
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p. 33). It is argued that all European communist systems established following World War II had leaders who 
developed cults, but their strength differed from country to country, and from leader to leader (Leese 2014). Some of 
the most frequently mentioned in this regard are the cults of the Soviet Union’s Joseph Stalin and Yugoslavia’s Josip 
Broz Tito. However, other less known and discussed communist leaders are also considered to have had cults, such 
as Hungary’s Mátyás Rákosi, Poland’s Bolesław Bierut, and Bulgaria’s Georgi Dimitrov (Apor et al. 2004).  
It is suggested in the literature that these cults were developed because of, among other things, certain 
characteristics of communist countries’ political, party and media systems. First, it is claimed that reporting in systems 
with concentrated power (for example, presidential systems) is more personalised than in other systems where power 
is more evenly spread among political actors (parliamentary systems) (McAllister 2007; Langer 2011). There is some 
evidence to support this.
3
 If institutional characteristics really do contribute to an increased focus on individual 
political actors, then the institutional settings of communist systems might represent an ideal context for personalised 
reporting. Specifically, the constitutions of early European communist systems concentrated political power in the 
hands of an individual. In the first years following World War II, when most of the Central Eastern European 
communist systems were created, these countries were without exception ruled by strong leaders who held almost all 
political power (Furtak 1986). In the later communist period, starting from late 1950s, there was a shift from vesting 
one individual with this amount of power to a dual leadership. Political power was divided in these later stages of 
communist systems between the party leader, usually called the general secretary, and the formal head of the executive, 
who most frequently held the position of prime minister or president (Blondel 1992). Since it is argued that all 
important decisions were taken by the party, and that the role of state institutions was primarily to ‘put the party’s 
decisions into effect’ (Furtak 1986, p. 10), it would be logical to assume that the general secretary of the communist 
party had more power than the other leader, the formal head of state (McCauley & Carter 1986). However, this move 
towards dual leadership can be seen as indicative of communists’ desire to distribute power rather than concentrate it 
only in countries where the two positions could not be held by the same person. In the cases of Yugoslavia, Albania 
and Romania, the head of state was at the same time the party leader, so power was still concentrated and the political 
system was in the hands of a single individual (Blondel 1992). Consequently, it does not come as a surprise that the 
leaders of these respective countries—Yugoslavia’s Tito, Albania’s Enver Hoxha and Romania’s Nicolae 
                                                 
3 See Dalton & Wattenberg (2000). 
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Ceauşescu—had the strongest and most enduring leadership cults (Leese 2014). Hence, if a presidential political 
system in established Western democracies has the potential to make political communication actors focus on the 
individual who is vested with the most power at the expense of political collectives, the default power configuration 
of communist systems might contribute even more strongly to personalised politics. 
Second, the leadership cult literature suggests that political actors intentionally put the spotlight on the 
political leader in the early days of communist systems because the party had not yet been consolidated and was still 
weak. In other words, the focus on the political leader at the beginning of the communist period was considered 
necessary as the only way of legitimising the new system, given than the party was not yet organised and established 
(Ake 1966). The purpose of the strong leader was to unite different social groups by reshaping rituals and myths to 
create common goals (Cavalli 1998; Šiber 2007). The focus on the individual instead of the collective was therefore 
a political decision adopted for two main reasons: to legitimise the new system and to simplify the education and 
socialisation of the people (Apor et al. 2004). Legitimisation was based on the premise of the leader’s greatness and 
extraordinary qualities: the message that was communicated to the public was that there was no other person capable 
of running the country. The leader was also used as a means of simplifying values, beliefs and behaviours for the 
largely uneducated public, setting an example of how people should behave, what they should value, and what their 
interests should be.  
Third, it is argued that these cults were created by the extensive use of mass media (Plamper 2004; Rees 
2004; Eatwell 2006; Janjetović 2009). As Lauk (2008, p. 199) writes: the primary task of news presentation in former 
communist bloc journalism was not to chronicle daily events, but to glorify the Communist Party and its leaders.’ 
Consequently, it may be hypothesised that communist reporting was personalised and centred on the political leader. 
There is, however, very limited evidence for this theory.
4
 In their seminal work on news values, Galtung and Ruge 
claimed that communist countries had a ‘structural’ style of presenting news characterised by an emphasis on social 
forces while ‘the names of the actors’ simply disappear. A focus on individuals in news stories was more common in 
Western media (Galtung and Ruge 1965, p. 68). More recent studies support their claim that communist media 
reporting was, unlike in the West, more strongly structural rather than person-centred in style. For example, Gerbner’s 
                                                 
4 A rare study that confirms this theory of person-centred media output is Martensson’s analysis of three 
major Soviet newspapers in 1964, which found that Soviet newspapers pursued a person-centred rather than structural 
reporting style  (Galtung & Ruge 1965, p. 87). 
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analysis of the coverage of the 1960 General Assembly meeting in the New York Times and Hungarian newspapers 
showed that the New York Times named individuals around every line and a half, while Hungarian newspapers did so 
every eight lines (cited in Robinson 1977). This suggests that the New York Times used a more person-centred 
presentational style, while the communist Hungarian paper presented the meeting in a more structural way (Robinson 
1977, pp. 167–68). Two studies comparing Yugoslav and American news coverage, both carried out by Robinson 
(1977) at the beginning of 1960s, further reinforce this hypothesis. One study showed that the Associated Press placed 
the emphasis on individuals in 30% of its news items, while the Yugoslav news agency Tanjug did so in 23%. The 
difference is not great, but it does point to a more structural presentational style practised by the communist news 
agency. Robinson’s other study examined the same two agencies’ coverage of the Vietnam War. Here, the Associated 
Press put the focus on individuals in 70% of its news items, while only 25% of Tanjug’s reports were person-centred. 
Robinson (1977, p. 170) concludes that the Yugoslav reader acquired ‘a more structural explication of the issues 
involved’.  
These two competing theories―one claiming that communist media practised a person-centred presentation 
style, and the other that its coverage was more structural―make it difficult to reach any sound conclusions about the 
media representation of political actors in European communist societies. In addition, authors writing in the post-
communist period emphasise the differences rather than the similarities across European communist media systems, 
pointing to the fact that it is problematic to generalise in this context (Curran & Park 2000; Lauk 2008; Oates 2012; 
Tworzecki 2012; Coba 2013). Therefore, the real extent to which mediated political communication was centred on 
individuals, especially on political leaders, in communist systems, remains ambiguous. 
 
Democratisation―from leaders to parties? 
Certain continuities from the communist era can be observed in the early post-communist period, i.e. during the 1990s 
when the Central Eastern European countries entered the transitional phase of the democratisation process. The choice 
of institutional design in these new democracies largely depended upon the model of transition, which in turn depended 
upon the legacies of the former system (type of regime, level of industrialisation, former experiences with democratic 
regimes) (Easter 1997). In the end, the choice of institutional design was decided on the basis of the power relationship 
between the communist elite and their opposition. In the countries where the communist elite retained control over  
legislative, executive and judiciary institutions during the transition period, it was able to determine the institutional 
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design of the new system without having to negotiate with opposition forces. The communist elites consolidated in 
this way, who considered that they would ‘have the most to gain by limiting the access of others to state’s power 
resources’, opted for presidential political systems that represented the continuation of the focus on individual political 
actors from the former regime (Easter 1997, p. 211). Since such presidential systems promoted ‘a concentration of 
power on charismatic individuals’ and the dominance of ‘personal competition’ over ‘team spirit’ (Kitschelt 1995, p. 
452), they were the first choice of communist elites leading the transition because they expected to benefit from the 
‘name recognition of local and national leaders and clientelist networks’ (Kitschelt 1995, p. 453). The presidential 
political system was the most common institutional choice of post-communist countries (Easter 1997).  
However, the prevailing political system choice of post-communist countries of Central Europe was either a 
parliamentary system or a mixed, semi-presidential one. The parliamentary system was the most common outcome of 
the transitions in which the opposition forces gained considerable power at the expense of the communist elites 
following internal fragmentation (Easter 1997). Since in this situation neither the opposition nor the communist elites 
were confident in securing enough public support for autonomous rule, they opted for a system in which neither would 
be able to control all power resources if elected. A parliamentary system was also a way of preventing the rise of a 
new strong leader, a principle deployed in the establishment of new Western democracies after World War II (Cavalli 
1998). A semi-presidential system was the rarer choice. Kitschelt (1995) argues that this was the choice of a 
communist elite that had lost certain amount of power but was still able to negotiate with opposition forces. By 
introducing a semi-presidential system, the communist elite was able to partly secure the continuation of personalised 
politics while necessarily complying with some of the opposition’s demands, which usually related to decreasing the 
focus on individual political actors and enhancing the power of collectives. 
 Whichever the choice of new political system, it is argued that post-communist political actors decided to 
keep the focus on individuals at the expense of collectives (Lewis 2000). This was partly down to the nature of the 
newly formed party systems. Scholars mostly agree that the new parties that emerged after the introduction of multi-
party systems were, at least in the beginning, poorly organised, without roots in society that would help them make 
ties with citizens, and lacking clearly defined identities, given the high level of uncertainty about the needs and 
interests of the electorate. Additionally, except for the reformed communist parties, the new parties had little or no 
political, let alone democratic experience (Kitschelt 1995; Lewis 2000; Tomšič & Prijon 2010; Gheorgita 2015). Since 
these weak parties were not able to attract and mobilise voters, party systems were often characterised by ‘the 
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dominance of individuals and political leaders over party structures’ (Lewis 2000, p. 154). This was particularly true 
for systems with charismatic parties, which Kitschelt (1995, p. 449) defines as ‘not much more than an unstructured 
mass of people rallying around a leader’. In short, it seems that, even when multi-party parliamentary systems were 
introduced, parties were weak and unorganised and therefore dependent upon their leaders and clientelistic networks. 
This presumably led to the emphasis on leaders by political actors. 
Given that it is usually suggested that the political elite remained in control of media, at least in the early 
post-communist period (Gross 2003; Lauk 2009; Lani 2013), it could be expected that if the political elite decided to 
focus on individuals in their communication, it had the power to make the media report in a similar way as well. 
However, the extent to which the political elite was able to control the media varied among post-communist countries, 
and across different stages of democratisation. Hence, even if political actors were able to make media personalise 
their reporting in some post-communist countries and periods, their influence might have decreased with the rise in 
the autonomy of media, the institutionalisation of the party system, and the rise of civil society. Once the media 
reached this ‘second phase of mediatization’5 (Stromback 2008), in which it became mostly free from political 
influences, it might have started reporting by following media logic, that is, by adhering to news values and journalistic 
storytelling techniques, such as simplification, personalisation and polarisation. In other words, it can be speculated 
that the more freedom media gained in the post-communist period, it pursued more person-centred reporting, in line 
with media logic.  
In summary, while mainstream personalisation theory suggests that political communication nowadays is 
more personalised than was the case a couple of decades ago, the literature concerning European communist and post-
communist systems suggests that political communication there was always personalised and continues to be so. The 
aim of this article is to put these assumptions to the test and examine to what extent the media personalisation 
                                                 
5 Stromback (2008) argues there are four phases of the mediatization of politics. In the first phase, the media 
becomes the most important source of information, making politics mediated. In the second phase, media gains more 
independence from political actors and starts to be governed by media logic. The third phase is characterised by 
growing importance of media, due to which political actors start to adapt to media logic in order to ensure their 
politics are mediated. In the final phase, political actors adopt media logic as their own, which means that the media 
has colonized politics.  
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hypothesis is relevant in an authoritarian system and during its various stages of democratisation. Specifically, the 
questions that this study aims to answer and hypotheses that are being tested are as follows: 
 
RQ1: Can leader cults be seen as representing an extreme case of media personalisation? 
H1: The communist leader was the most media prominent political actor in his time, and his media 
prominence is significantly higher than that of his successors in the democratic era. 
  
RQ2: How, if at all, does media prominence of political actors change in the process of democratisation?  
H2: Political leaders remained highly media visible during the process of democratisation, at all phases of 
the process being more media prominent than collective political actors and institutions.  
 
RQ3: Is there evidence to suggest that power is being portrayed in the media as increasingly diffused and 
ascribed to institutions rather than individuals in the process of democratisation?  
H3: Politics remained portrayed as dominated by individuals during the democratisation process, with 
political parties defined by and associated with primarily their leaders.  
 
Research design 
These questions are answered through a longitudinal content analysis of major national daily newspapers in 
communist Yugoslavia, and one of its successor states, Croatia. These cases have been chosen because the analysis of 
the media portrayal of the communist leadership in Yugoslavia has great potential to provide insights into an extreme 
case of media personalisation, and there is evidence to suggest that a high degree of media personalisation has 
continued in post-communist Croatia as well, which provides a prime testing ground for the hypothesis of continued 
media personalisation.  
Specifically, the Yugoslav leader, Josip Broz Tito, might represent an ideal example of the extreme form of 
media personalisation as it is widely held that he alone kept multinational Yugoslavia together (Zaninovich 1983; 
Pavlowitch 1992; Velikonja 2008; Kolář 2014). Not only did he inspire one of the longest-lasting leadership cults in 
Europe, but there is also evidence to suggest that his cult lives on (Carmichael 2010). As Volčič (2007, p. 30) writes, 
‘everywhere in the former-Yugoslav republics, Josip Broz Tito seems to continue to embody Yugoslavia that many 
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people remember in a positive light. Hence, analysis of Tito’s media representation might give valuable insights into 
whether leadership cults represent an extreme case of media personalisation. 
Furthermore, the early post-communist period in Croatia was also dominated by an individual, President 
Franjo Tuđman. When it gained independence, Croatia opted for a semi-presidential political system, which 
concentrated significant power in the hands of the president. Although Tuđman was officially sharing his executive 
power with a prime minister, it is often suggested that Tuđman held absolute power (Radoš 2005; Boduszynski 2010). 
Jović and Lamont (2010 p. 1613) nicely capture Tuđman's domination of Croatia in the 1990s: ‘Not only did Franjo 
Tuđman effectively control all state institutions and organisations, but he intervened in civil society, kept the media 
under firm control, and even shaped popular culture.’ This all suggests that politics was quite personalised in the early 
post-communist period as well. 
 Croatia is usually considered to have entered the consolidation period of the democratisation process in 2000s 
(Čular 2005), following its transformation into a parliamentary democracy, the rise of an autonomous mass media, the 
development of civil society, and the election of political leaders who were no longer, as Tito and Tuđman were, 
considered ‘fathers’ of the nation (Ilišin 2001; Udovičić 2011; Freedom House 2017). However, this did not 
necessarily mean a rise in the importance of political parties. Nikić Čakar (2010) claims that Ivo Sanader, who 
succeeded Tuđman as the leader of the biggest Croatian political party, the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska 
demokratska zajednica―HDZ), and led it throughout 2000s, made the party presidential by placing himself at the 
centre of party processes, electoral campaigns and the executive, resulting in the continuation of personalised politics 
in the late stages of democratisation. 
 Overall, the study of Yugoslavia and Croatia, one of its successors, seems ideal for testing the hypotheses of 
communist leader cult-building through mass media, and the continued focus on political leaders in media reporting 
during the democratisation process. The study covers a time period from 1945, when Tito came to power, until 2015. 
Reporting on six political leaders, all heads of the executive in office for more than three years, was analysed, 
specifically, two presidents (Tito and Tuđman) and four prime ministers (Račan, Sanader, Kosor and Milanović).6  
                                                 
6 In 1990s Croatia had a semi-presidential system in which the president was head of executive. From 2000, 
when the parliamentary system was introduced, the president and the prime minister switched roles, with the prime 
minister or his/her government gaining most executive powers. Hence, since 2000 prime ministers have been heads 
of the executive and are included in the analysis. 
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The materials of analysis are daily newspapers, since these are the only primary source available for such an 
extensive period. To get an overview of the representation of political actors in mass media, three daily newspapers 
published on Croatian territory were analysed for the examined period. The first one is Vjesnik, established as a state-
owned publication in 1940 and usually considered to be the nearest, among the papers in our survey, to a broadsheet 
(Jergović 2004; Novak 2005). It continued to be state-owned until it ceased publication in 2012. The second source is 
Večernji list, a daily that was founded by the state in 1959 and privatised at the end of 1990s, and can be considered 
to be a half-tabloid, that is, a hybrid publication with elements of both quality and tabloid papers (Kanižaj, 2006). It 
was the second-most read paper in the whole of Yugoslavia, and it was always either the top selling paper in Croatia, 
or among the top three with highest circulation. The third source is the daily 24sata, the only Croatian tabloid, which 
was established by Styria Media Group AG in 2005 and soon became the most read paper in the country (Car & 
Andrijašević 2012). It was included in the analysis of the leaders who came to power after 2005, so that the study 
would reflect the commercialisation and tabloidisation of the media that occurred in the 2000s. The analysis focuses 
on the final week of the election campaign in which a leader first came to power, or the week prior to a leader’s 
appointment to office if he/she did not win office through elections.
7
 These weeks were chosen as periods that illustrate 
most intense reporting on politics and political actors. A total of 16,363 articles were sampled from the selected 
newspapers in the time periods specified above. The subset of data analysed in more detail—1,116 articles—consists 
of all articles that mention the leader and/or his/her party (see Table 1 for details). An inter-coder reliability test
8
 was 
conducted with a second coder who coded 120 articles (11.9% of the sample). The inter-coder reliability scores for all 
                                                 
7 Exceptions were made in cases of Tito and Tuđman, whose first years in office were not included in the 
analysis. In the case of Tito, the materials (newspaper archives) were not available for his first years in office (1945–
1948). Instead, the year in which Tito was appointed president for the last time (1974) was chosen as the first year of 
analysis, since two newspapers' archives were available from this point in time. The second exception was made in 
relation to Tuđman: although he acted as president of Croatia from 1990, Croatia did not formally declare 
independence until 1991, so the 1992 presidential elections can be seen as the first formal elections in the independent 
state. Therefore, the last week of the 1992 presidential campaign was included as representative of Tuđman’s first 
year in office. 
8 Inter-coder reliability score was calculated according to Holsti's (1969) method of agreement―2A/ 
(N1+N2)―whereas A is the number of units in which coders agree and N1 and N2 are the number of units coded by 
each of the coders. 
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relevant variables were 1, indicating full agreement between the first and second coder and hence, credibility and 
reliability of data. 
Table 1: Sampling details 
Leader Period in office 
Sample 
Time frame Total articles 
Leader & party 
mentions 
Tito 14/1/45-4/5/80 10-16/05/74 
VL=677 
VJ=740 
n=169 
Tuđman 30/05/90-10/12/99 25-31/07/92 
VL=1315 
VJ=1088 
n=229 
Račan 27/1/00-23/12/03 27/12/99-2/1/00 
VL=1357 
VJ=1104 
n=129 
Sanader 23/12/03-6/7/09 15-21/11/03 
VL=1732 
VJ=1730 
n=240 
Kosor 6/7/09-23/12/11 30/6/09-6/7/09 
VL=2094 
VJ=1138 
24S=966 
n=247 
Milanović 23/12/11-22/1/16 26/11/11-2/12/11 
VL=1074 
VJ=568 
24S=780 
n=102 
Total   16363 1116 
 
Notes: Total articles = total number of articles published in a newspaper in the analysed week; Leader and party 
mentions = number of articles that mention a leader and/or his/her party; VL= Večernji list; VJ = Vjesnik; 24S = 
24sata) 
 
Findings and discussion 
To examine the extent to which the media focused on individual politicians and political parties, and whether their 
media visibility changed in the process of democratisation, three indicators were created. The first one looks at the 
percentage of articles in which a political leader was mentioned relative to all published articles in his/her sample (see 
Figure 1); the second reveals the ratio of leader-to-party mentions (see Figure 2); while the third provides a more 
nuanced look at the media prominence of individual and collective political actors by examining the extent to which 
politicians other than political leaders appear in party-related articles (see Figure 3).  
 
FIGURE 1: Percentage of all articles in analysed newspapers mentioning a head of the executive 
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FIGURE 2: Ratio of leader-to-party mentions 
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FIGURE 3: Percentage of articles mentioning political leader and/or his/her party that refer only to leader 
(leader), only to party (party), party and leader (both) or party and some other party member (other) 
 
 
The communist leader―the one and only 
The analysis of Yugoslav media seems to support the theories advocated in the leadership cult literature, since all three 
indicators show that communist media reporting was more personalised than structural in style. However, the 
leadership cult theories can be seen as only partly justified by this data, since Tito’s media prominence does not seem 
to be as extensive as the literature suggests.  
Specifically, as is evidenced in Figure 1, and in line with H1, Tito was the most media prominent political 
leader in Yugoslavia, mentioned in 8.4% of all articles published in the week before his appointment, and no leader 
in the democratisation period was close to reaching his level of mediated visibility. Furthermore, even when his media 
visibility is compared to that of his party, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Savez Komunista 
Jugoslavije―SKJ, before 1952 the Communist Party of Yugoslavia - Komunistička partija Jugoslavije), which was 
the only party in Yugoslavia and was considered central to all aspects of life (Furtak 1986), Tito still remains the most 
media prominent political actor in communist media. As is evident from Figure 2, the ratio of leader-to-party mentions 
in Tito’s case is 1.2, which means that he was more frequently mentioned in newspaper coverage than his party. 
Finally, a more detailed analysis of these references to him and/or his party, as is shown in Figure 3, also reveals that 
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as an individual he was the most visible political actor in the communist-era press of Yugoslavia. Of the articles that 
mention him and/or his party, Tito on his own appeared in 42.6%, while he was mentioned in 27.8% of the articles 
that mentioned the party. Hence, according to Tito’s media visibility, claims made in the leadership cult literature that 
the communist leader was the single most important political actor in this system seem to have merit. Whether the 
media was reflecting power relations in the country or constructing a perception of them (Hughes 2007), perhaps as 
instructed by the political elite who controlled them, Tito’s media prominence suggests that there might indeed have 
been a cult-building process in place and that he might have been the central figure in the political communication of 
this system. 
Notwithstanding, it remains questionable whether this data completely justify the hypothesis of the leader’s 
centrality to media communication in the communist system (Blondel 1992; Plamper 2004; Leese 2014). Tito might 
have been mentioned twice as often as most post-communist leaders, but he was still mentioned in only 8.4% of all 
published articles within his sample. Also, he was mentioned more frequently than his party, but the ratio of 1.2 points 
to the fact that the party was not significantly less visible than he was. In comparison, de Vreese et al. (2017) show 
that in the UK and the US, in 2012, politicians were almost four times more media-visible than their parties. Hence, 
the extent to which communist media put the focus on the leader does suggest that he was the most important political 
actor, but the amount of this attention does not seem to be as significant as would be expected from the leadership cult 
literature. However, this data does show that, relative to reporting in most periods of democratisation, reporting in 
communism was quite leader-centred. Accordingly, H1 has been confirmed.  
 
The persistence of the leadership cult 
To answer the question of how, if at all, the reporting style changed during the democratisation process, we need to 
look at the similarities and differences between reporting during communism and in the different periods of 
democratisation. The data from the empirical analysis of communist and post-communist newspapers points to 
significant similarities in personalised reporting in the communist and post-communist period, but only in the 
transitional stage of the latter. Specifically, all three indicators point to the fact that leader-centred reporting related to 
communist leader Tito is quite similar to the reporting of the first Croatian president, Tuđman, who was head of the 
executive during the 1990s. According to Figure 1, continuity can be observed between the communist and early post-
communist period with regard to the percentage of articles in which leaders were mentioned. There is a drop from 
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Tito (8.4%) to Tuđman (6.6%), but no other leader after them received the same or higher levels of media attention. 
In addition, Figure 2 shows that these two leaders were reported similarly in relation to their parties. While Tito’s ratio 
of leader-to-party mentions was 1.2, Tuđman’s was 1. No head of the executive in the consolidation phase of 
democratisation was more or equally media-visible as their party. Finally, a more detailed analysis of references to 
leader and/or party points to the same conclusions in the case of Tuđman as in the case of Tito. As is evident from 
Figure 3, both Tito and Tuđman were on their own more than twice as media-visible as their parties on their own. 
Also, the majority of articles that mentioned Tito’s party also mentioned him, which is the case with Tuđman and the 
HDZ as well. Boduszynski (2010, p. 92) writes about the HDZ in the 1990s as being ‘characterized in large part by 
the charismatic authority of President Tuđman’, who established a ‘strong centralized leadership’ (Lamont 2010, p. 
62), which is a practice that seems to have been visible in media reporting as well. 
 In short, the similarities between the amount of media attention given to Tito and Tuđman, and the differences 
between Tuđman and other post-communist leaders, point to the fact that there might be more similarities between 
communist and transitional, early post-communist eras than among post-communist leaders. 
 
Centralised depersonalisation 
In spite of the similarities in the extent to which leaders and political parties were media-visible during the communist 
and early post-communist periods, overall all three indicators show that the media’s focus on the most powerful 
individual political actors—heads of the executive—has significantly decreased since the communist era, hence 
refuting H2. In other words, when the trends over time are examined, it becomes evident that the most powerful 
politicians are progressively less media-visible. This has resulted in the centralised depersonalisation of media 
reporting, although the trend is not linear.  
 Specifically, the percentage of articles mentioning leaders in most intense political periods drops from 8.4% 
(Tito) to 2.1% (Milanović), with quite a strong negative trend evident in Pearson’s coefficient of -0.9. The negative 
trend is also strong in relation to the ratio of leader-to-party mentions (r=-0.77), since the ratio decreases from 1.2 
(Tito) to 0.6 (Milanović). Furthermore, from the sample of articles mentioning the leader and/or his party, the 
percentage of articles solely mentioning the leader drop from 42.6% (Tito) to 22.5% (Milanović), Pearson’s coefficient 
being -0.72. In short, all data related to the leader-centred media reporting of head executives points to the fact that 
the media coverage has decreasingly focused on the most important and powerful politicians in the country. While it 
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is beyond the scope of this study to examine the factors driving this trend, it is worth noting that the most significant 
decrease in the media prominence of political leaders came in the consolidation phase of the democratisation period 
when Croatia introduced the parliamentary system and proportional electoral system, and the autonomy and 
commercialisation of media both increased. These might have been some of the factors that contributed to a greater 
focus on political institutions in this young democracy.  
While the most powerful politicians lost a significant amount of media attention during the democratisation 
process, there is evidence to suggest that political parties were given increased media attention. Specifically, in the 
consolidation period, no head of the executive was more media-visible than his/her party, with the ratio of leader-to-
party mentions varying between 0.5 and 0.8 (see Figure 2). However, while the number of articles solely mentioning 
the leader—that is, leader-centred reporting—continually decreased over time, party-centred reporting measured as 
the percentage of articles in which the party is mentioned on its own (without any other party officials), does not show 
any significant trend (see Figure 3). If Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor is excluded from the analysis, and according to 
some indicators her case can be seen as exceptional among the post-2000 leaders,
9
 there is a positive trend (r=0.75) 
demonstrating that the media are increasingly giving more attention to parties as collective bodies, independent of 
their leaders and members. This positive trend in party-centred reporting and the negative trend in leader-centred 
reporting have led to parties becoming more media-prominent on their own than their leaders are as individual actors 
in the consolidation period of the democratisation process (with the exception of Kosor). In other words, since 2000 
there were more articles that only mentioned the party than mentioned only its leader. Given that political scientists 
claim that, even in this consolidation stage, Croatian politics were dominated by political leaders (Nikić Čakar 2010; 
Raos 2015), the way in which the media represents political actors is perhaps surprising. This dissonance would 
suggest that the media is not merely reflecting the hierarchy of political power in the society, but that it may be 
attempting to construct them by creating a perception of the importance and centrality of political parties in political 
processes. In the light of democratisation theory, and for advocates of party democracies (Manin 1997; Langer 2011), 
this may be seen as a positive development since it suggests a break with the authoritarian past and the potential rise 
of the importance of political institutions. 
                                                 
9 Kosor is the most media prominent post-2000 leader according to the percentage of articles she was 
mentioned in. Also, among post-2000 heads of executive, she has the highest ratio of leader-to-party mentions. 
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 Overall, the identification of centralised depersonalisation is an important finding, since it demonstrates that 
trends related to the media representation of political actors in this Central Eastern European country are quite different 
to those observed in other European democracies. Specifically, while media personalisation theory and research 
suggests that political leaders have over the past few decades became more media-visible (McAllister 2007; Langer 
2011; Balmas et al. 2014), this study shows that a young Central Eastern European democracy experienced a 
completely opposite trend. In addition, this analysis suggests that political institutions in contemporary society are far 
more media-visible in the examined Central Eastern European setting than research suggests they are in other parts of 
Europe (de Vreese et al. 2017). This indicates that the media personalisation theory has serious limitations, and that 
theories related to developments in modern politics and political communication should not be applied uncritically 
beyond the context in which they were developed and tested.  
 
Decentralised personalisation 
In spite of mentioned trends, Figure 3 also shows that overall, references to parties are in all cases dominated by 
references to individual political actors: leaders or other party officials. Thus, although parties are in general quite 
prominent in media reporting, they are continually seen as almost inseparable from their members. As is suggested in 
the literature concerning post-communist party systems, and outlined in H3, individual political actors, especially 
leaders, dominate parties (Lewis 2000) and parties are often defined by their leaders and not the other way around, as 
is the case in Western democracies (King 2002; Grbeša 2008). The strength of connection between leaders and their 
parties is visible from this analysis too. All parties studied in this analysis were most frequently mentioned alongside 
their leaders, and less in connection to other party members. This seems to confirm H3. 
Parties continued to be largely defined by their leaders throughout the democratisation period in Croatia; 
however, this analysis also shows that, during this process, the parties were increasingly associated with party 
members other than the leader in media reporting. Figure 3 shows that the amount of reporting in which the party is 
mentioned alongside a party member other than the head of the executive has grown over time (r=0.73). This suggests 
that a leader might be seen, based on media reporting, as the most important or powerful person in the party, but 
following the transitional period, other party officials were accorded more space in the media. In this way the media 
might have contributed to creating a public perception of a more democratic party system in which parties are not 
solely the means that political leaders use to accomplish personal goals but rather institutions in which different 
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interests and ideas can be shared and advocated, and political power is, at least to an extent, diffused among its 
members.  
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to test the media personalisation hypothesis in a Central Eastern European context by 
examining the extent to which European communist leadership cults can be seen as extreme forms of media 
personalisation, and how, if at all, the media representation of political actors changes during the process of 
democratisation. While the study is limited by being an exploratory case study, which means that its findings cannot 
be generalised beyond the researched case, it does point to several important findings.  
First, the Yugoslav communist leader Tito was, as expected, represented in the media as the central and most 
important political actor in communist politics. He was also more media-visible than any political leader of the new 
democracy that followed the transition period. However, it is questionable whether the extent of his media prominence 
warrants the idea of communist leadership cults representing the most extreme form of media personalisation. Indeed, 
while one of the most powerful communist leaders in Europe was only slightly more media-visible than his party, 
evidence suggests that in contemporary UK and US politicians are four times more visible than their parties (de Vreese 
et al. 2017). This might mean that communist leadership cults do not represent extreme media personalisation, and 
that the extent to which some Western media nowadays personalise political leadership is unprecedented in modern 
history.  
Second, the results show that although there are significant similarities between the representation of leaders 
in the communist and early post-communist eras, political leaders received significantly less media attention in the 
process of democratisation (centralised depersonalisation). This trend suggests that individual political actors have 
been slowly losing power in this Central Eastern European country, while parties as collectives are gaining relevance. 
This is the opposite trend to that predicted by the mainstream media personalisation theory and research (Dalton & 
Wattenberg 2000; Langer 2011). Consequently, the relevance and applicability of existing media personalisation 
scholarship to Central Eastern Europe is questionable, as it does not seem to contribute to understanding of the 
development of media personalisation in this context. There is a need for a comparative study to shed light onto the 
generalisibility of this finding, and to contribute to development of new theories better able to explain patterns in the 
media representation of political actors in the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. However, 
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it should be noted that in spite of the observed depersonalisation trend, results show that parties are still represented 
as dominated by individuals, especially their leaders, as was hypothesised based on existing literature (Lewis 2000; 
King 2002). 
Alongside centralised depersonalisation, Croatia has experienced a trend of decentralised personalisation, 
meaning that party members other than political leaders are increasingly mentioned in media with the parties they 
represent. Both of these trends suggest that Croatia’s media is increasingly representing political power as more 
diffused and less centralised and personalised. This is contrary to media representation patterns found across other 
European regions (de Vreese et al. 2017), so this again shows that theories and phenomena found elsewhere should 
not be uncritically ascribed to the Central Eastern European context. These findings also suggest that some 
assumptions about powerful political leaders in Central Eastern Europe who appear to centralise and personalise 
politics should be critically examined, as the media seem to be indicating that power is more diffused and less 
centralised than was the case in the past, and is the case in other European regions.  
 Given that this study was a textual analysis, it was not possible to determine if the media reporting was 
motivated by specific intentions; that is, it was only possible to speculate if there was any strategy on their part. Also, 
it was not possible to establish how audiences received the mediated information. Future research on these topics is 
needed to reveal whether the media really are strategically and intentionally trying to create the perception of diffused 
and depersonalised power and as such, are acting as active advocates of party democracy. Further research could also 
shed more light on how the changing media representations of political actors were perceived by the audience, and 
whether the trends of centralised depersonalisation and decentralised personalisation can be seen as characteristics of 
European new democracies in general. 
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